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• . LIVELYcontroversy has centered in recent years on the methodology
•;. . for evaluating life-saving on government projects and in public policy.
It is now well understood that valuation should be carried out in terms
ofa proper set of compensating variations, on a par with benelit meas-
• • uresused in other areas of project evaluation. To put it plainly, the
i value of a life is the amount members of society are willing to pay to
save one. It is clear that most previously devised measures relate in
• avery way, if at all, to the conceptually appropriate meas-
• ure.'However, in view of recent and prospective legislation on product
•:: . ... andindustrial safety standards, some new estimates are sorely needed.
This paper presents a range of rather conservative estimates for
one important component of life value: the demand price for a person's
•
•• ownsafety. Estimates are obtained by answering the question, "How
much will a person pay to reduce the probability of his own death by
a 'small' amount?" Another component of life value is the amount
other people (family and friends) are willing to pay to save the life
*Thisresearch was partially funded by a grant from the National Institute of Educa-
lion. Martin J. Bailey. Victor Fuchs, Jack Hirshleifer, and Paul Taubman provided
•
• helpfulcomments on an initial draft.
'See Schelling (1968), Usher (1972) and especially Mishan (1971) and the references
therein.266 Marketand Nonmarket Aspects of Real Earnings . .•.
ofa particular individual. This second component is ignored. As a
. -
matterof course, a new conceptual framework for analyzing this prob- ...
lemis offered. We believe our model will be valuable for other investi-
gations in this and related areas.
The usual methodology of preference revelation from observed be- ..-. '.. . . ....
haviorin demand theory is the most natural way of approaching the
problem. Two types of behavior are relevant in this connection. First, . -:
individualsvoluntarily undertake many risks of death and injury that :
arenot inherent in their everyday situation, and which could be
avoided through expenditure of their own resources.2 Suppose a person . . .
.
isobserved taking a known incremental risk that could be removed by •..
spendingone dollar Then the implicit value of avoiding the additional
risk must be something less than one dollar or else it would not have
been observed For example, many people would not purchase auto-
mobile seat belts if they were not mandatory Further, when installa-
tion was required, many individuals did not use them, or at least that
was so prior to the tied installation of ignition locks and warrnng buz-
zers Some people make a point of crossing streets in the middle of the
block rather than at corners, most do not completely fireproof their
homes, and so forth While these and other examples provide scattered
evidence on death and injury risk evaluation, it appears doubtful
whether they can be systematized enough to yield very convincing
evidence on the matter The second kind of behavior is observed in
the labor market in conjunction with risky jobs Analysis of those data
is pursued here
Our method follows up Adam Smith s ancient suggestion that in-
dividuals must be induced to take risky jobs through a set of compen-
sating differences in wage rates Here the evidence is highly systematic
and the data are good Different work situations exhibit vastly different
work related probabilities of death and injury Moreover, lots of data
are available on wages in these jobs, onpersonal characteristics
of people who work at them, and on the industrial and technical char-
acteristics of firms who offer them Further, parties who voluntarily
face such nsks daily and as a major part of their lives, or production
processes, have a special interest in obtaining reliable and objective
information about the nature of the risks involved This is especially
true of very risky jobs. Finally, we have uncovered a new source of . .
..:
genuineactuarial data on death rates in risky occupations that is . - - - •.
superiorto other existing data sources and that until now has not been -. - . -
usedfor estimation. . - . . -. . -
2 Suchan approach is suggested by Bailey (1968) and Fromm (1968). - ... - -The Value of Saving a Life 267
Smith'stheory has been familiar to economists for almost two
hundred years and, in fact, forms the basis for the best recent inquiries
into the economics of safety.3 Yet very little effort has gone into em-
pirical implementation of the idea. Some people have been hostile to
it, asserting— without proof— that forces producing observed wage
variation are so varied and complex as to preclude isolating the effect
of risk. As will be demonstrated below, Smith's logic suggests that the
labor market can be viewed as providing a mechanism for implicit
trading in risk (and in other aspects of on-the-job consumption) with
the degree of risk (and other job attributes) varying from one job to
another. It certainly is not clear why price determination in such mar-
kets should be more complex than in any other markets where tied
sales occur, such as the housing market. Indeed, the hedonic recon-
struction of demand theory suggests that tied sales and package deals
of product "characteristics" are the rule and not the exception in
virtually all market exchange. Moreover, estimates presented below
belie the assertion that partial effects of job risk on wage rates cannot
be observed.
Given that risk-wage differentials can be estimated, How are the
estimates to be interpreted, and How do they relate to the demand
price for safety? Existence of a systematic, observable relationship
between job risk and wage rates means that it is possible to impute a
set of implicit marginal prices for various levels of risk. Like other
prices, the imputations result from intersections of demand and supply
functions. In the present case, there are supplies of people willing to
work at risky jobs and demands for people to fill them. Alternatively,
workers can be viewed as demanding on-the-job safety and firms can
be regarded as supplying it.
Difficulties of interpretation arise from two sources. Individuals
have different attitudes toward risk bearing and/or different physical
capacities to cope with risky situations. In addition, it is not neces-
sarily true that observed risks are completely and technologically
fixed in various occupations and production processes. For example,
changing TV tower light bulbs on top of the World Trade Building in
New York is inherently more risky than changing light bulbs inside
the offices of that building. However, it is conceivable to think of ways
in which the first job could be made safer, though at some real cost.
Whether, in general, firms find it in their interest to make safety-en-
hancing expenditures, and in what amounts, depends on weighing the
costs of providing additional safety to workers against prospective





...268 Marketand Nonmarket Aspects of Real Earnings
returns. Costs are incurred from installing and maintaining safety
devices and returns come in the form of lower wage payments and a
smaller wage bill. How can it be known whether observed risk-wage
relationships reflect mainly marginal costs of producing safety—the
supply of job safety—rather than the demand for it?
This question raises fundamental and familiar issues of identifica-
tion. Its resolution in terms of job attributes (or in terms of goods
attributes in the hedonic view of demand, for that matter) requires a
framework of analysis slightly altered from the usual one. The identi-
fication problem is resolved on a conceptual level in the following
sections, where the nature of equilibrium in the implicit market for
job risk is examined in some detail.4 We show how the observations
relate to underlying distributions of worker attitudes toward risk and
to the structure of safety technology and particular production pro-
cesses. The extent to which inferences about the demand for safety
can be unscrambled from wage and risk observations quite naturally
follows from this exercise. Data, estimates and interpretation of the
results are presented subsequently.
THE MARKET FOR JOB SAFETY
As noted above, the theory of equalizing differences suggests labor
market transactions can be treated as tied sales. Workers sell their
labor, but at the same time purchase nonmonetary and psychic aspects
of their jobs. Firms purchase labor, but also sell nonmonetary aspects
of work. Thus, firms are joint producers: some output is sold on prod-
ucts markets and other output is sold to workers in conjunction with
labor-service rentals. For purposes of exposition, we concentrate on
one nonmonetary aspect of jobs, namely the risks of injury and death
to which they give rise. The model can easily be extended to several
attributes such as free lunches, good labor relations, prospects for on-
the-job learning and the like, but the resulting complexity would de-
tract from the main point.
For purposes of analyzing demand for job safety, it is sufficient to
consider a market for productively and personally homogeneous
workers. Assume worker attitudes toward death and injury risk are
independent of their exogenously acquired skills. Workers in this
market all have the same skill and personal characteristics, though
tastes for job risk bearing generally differ among them. Workers are
productively homogeneous, and the only distinguishing character-
istic of jobs is the amount of death and injury risk associated with
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each of them.5 Jobs exhibiting the same risks are identical, and, by
assumption, the personal identity of particular employers and employ-
ees is irrelevant to the problem. Job risk itself is a multidimensional
concept and requires, at least, a distinction between deaths and injury
probabilities, on one hand, and various levels of injury severity, on
the other. Again, in line with our aim at simplification, represent job
risk by a univariate index p. Further, let p denote the probability of a
"standard accident." Then, each job is perfectly described by a par-
ticular value of p on the unit interval.
Equilibrium in the job market is characterized by a function W(p),
yielding the wage rate associated with each value of p. In fact W(p) is
a functional generalization of Smith's equalizing differences concept.
Given an equilibrium function W(p), each worker chooses an optimal
value of p by comparing psychic costs of increased risk with monetary
returns in the form of higher wages. This assumes, of course, that
workers are risk averse and W(p) is increasing in p. Operationally,
optimal choice is achieved through each worker applying for a job
offering the desired degree of risk (p). Firms decide what risks their
jobs contain by comparing costs of providing additional safety with
returns in the form of lower wage payments, and are constrained by
their basic underlying technologies. W(p) is an equilibrium function
when the number of workers applying for jobs at each value of risk
equals the number of jobs offered at each risk. Therefore, W(p) serves
as an equilibrating device for matching or marrying off workers and
firms, the same role that prices play in standard markets.
Analysis of optimal choices of workers and firms gives an intuitive
picture of the mechanism generating the observations on risk and
prices (the function W(p)). Both decisions are considred in turn. We
have sometimes found it convenient to think in terms of supply of
workers to risky jobs and firms' demands for job risk, rather than the
obverse concepts of workers' demand for job safety and firms' supply
of it: safety is the negative of risk.
reader should note that analysis of worker job choice is confined to people with
identical personal characteristics. The point is tricky and will be considered again below.
For now, the following example will have to do. Suppose clumsy and careless persons
have large negative externalities in risky settings involving groups of workers. Then a set
of equalizing differences must arise on worker characteristics (one of which is "careless-
ness") that are not independent of risk. Costs of employing a careless worker exceed
the costs of employing a one, and the latter must be paid less than the former.
Employers attempt to internalize these externalities by choosing employees with the
optimal packages of personal characteristics. It is as if there are separate risk markets for
workers with each bundle of personal characteristics, and the present analysis of worker
choice is confined to only one of those markets.270 Marketand Nonmarket Aspects of Real Earnings
AN EXAMPLE
A good starting point for our analysis is the essay by Walter 01(1973).
Some fundamental aspects of the problem and our basic methodology
are well illustrated by proving a variant of Oi's main result in very
simple fashion and going on from there.
Again, suppose all job risk involves standard injuries and can be
represented by work time lost and, consequently, by earnings lost.
Deaths and "pain and suffering" due to injuries are ignored for the time
being. Adopting this simplification, injuries can be measured in mone-
tary equivalents: a proportion of the wage permanently lost, say, kW,
where k is an exogenously determined constant and 0 <k <1.Work-
ers choose jobs offering injury probability p, basing decisions on maxi-
mization of expected utility. Let U(Y) represent some worker's
utility function, where Y is the prospect of certain income. Assume risk
aversion: U' >0and U" <0.Assume a perfect insurance market: the
cost of insurance equals its actuarial value, with no additional load
factor, and workers choosing jobs offering injury probability p can
purchase insurance at price p1(1 —p)per dollar coverage. Both
workers and insurance companies know the true probabilities and
there is no moral hazard. Let I denote the amount of insurance pur-





+pU[(1 —k)W(p)+ 1] (1)
where W— [p1(1 —p)]Iis net income if an accident does not occur,
and W(1 —k)+ I is income if it does. The worker chooses p and I to
maximize E.
Consider optimal amounts of insurance coverage first, conditional
on an arbitrary value of p. Differentiate E with respect to I, set the
result equal to zero and simplify to obtain
U'(W—
1l)=U'[W(l —k)+J] (2)
orequalization of marginal utility in both states of the world. In that
losses are converted into monetary equivalents and U is strictly in-
creasing in its argument, condition (2) can be realized only if incomes
in both states of the world are equated. That is, (2) implies I =(1—p)
kW. Substituting this result into equation1 and simplifying gives
F =U[(I—pk)W(p)] (3)The Value of Saving a Life 271
Theproblem has been converted to optimal choice of p, conditional on
prior optimization of insurance coverage.
Define an acceptance wage 0asthe payment necessary to make the
worker indifferent to jobs offering alternative risks, again conditioned
on purchasing optimal insurance coverage for each risk. The accept-
ance wage is defined for a constant expected utility index E,andwith
recourse to (3) implicitly is defined by
E= U[0(p,E;k)(l — plc)] (4)
Invertequation (4)
0(p, E;k) = U1(E)l(l — plc)f(E)I(1 — pk) (5)
Equation 5 defines a family of indifference curves in the earnings/risk
(0,p) plane such that the compensated (utility held constant) accept-
ance wage is increasing in risk at an increasing rate: The marginal rate
of substitution between job risk and money is positive and increasing.
Differentiating the log of (5) with respect to p shows that the relative
marginal acceptance wage, = k/(l — pk),depends only on risk,
and k is independent of E. In other words, relative marginal acceptance
wages are the same for all workers, independently of workers' degrees
of risk aversion. This is due to the presence of perfect insurance so that
full coverage is rational.
The fact that the function isequal for all workers yields some
arbitrage restrictions on observable wage/risk relationships in the
market. Arbitrage mandates the restrictionW'(p)/ W(p)=8(E)
80(p,E)
for every possible value of p. For proof, assume to the con-
trary that at some value of p, say p", W'(p*)/W(p*) >
E)
*E)
Then, everybody currently working at a job with risk p's'
could improve themselves by applying forjobs involving slightly higher
risk. Additional wages on higher-risk jobs exceed relative marginal
valuations of them and expected utility must rise from taking slightly
larger risks. Jobs such asare unfilled, and relative wages have to
change in an obvious way to induce people to apply for them. Exactly
the opposite logic applies when the inequality goes in the other direc-
. . ...
—.1
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tion. In that case, it is also not rational for anyone to apply for any job
offering risk p'1'. Jobs offering smaller risks yield larger expected utility
and W'(p*)/W(p*) must increase if p* type jobs are to be filled. There-
fore W'(p)/W(p) = musthold for all p, and the observed market
wage-risk function must satisfy W'(p)/W(p) =k/(l—pk).This market
equilibrium condition can be integrated to yield
W(p) =C/(I —pk) (6)
In (6), C is a constant of integration, determined by the side condition
that total quantity of labor supplied to the market equals total demand
for it. Only if market observations lie along an approximately semi-
log function such as (6) can the labor market be in equilibrium in this
simple example.
The problem considered above reveals the basic essentials of
Smith's theory. In this case, wage differentials are exactly equalizing
everywhere, at both the margin and on the average, and wage differ-
ences only reflect actuarial differences in risk between jobs. To see
this, note that expected earning is (1 —p)W(p)+ p(l —k)W(p),which,
from (6), equals C: Expected earning is constant across all jobs,
independent of job risk and the distribution of risk aversion in the
labor force. Following the general "free lunch theorem," such a dis-
tinct and strong result comes from strong assumptions. Perfect in-
surance implies till risk-averse workers act as expected income maxi-
mizers and induces them to act alike, independently of their degree of
risk aversion. The result would not have been true had we allowed for
pain and suffering, imperfect insurance (nonzero load and hence
incomplete coverage), or interpersonal differences in physical capac-
ities to cope with job risk.6 Equalizing wage-risk relationships de-
pends on the demand for workers, as well as on the supply of them, in
those cases, as will be spelled out below.
It is important to note differences between compensation and earn-
ings before turning to a more general formulation of the problem. The
6Supposerealized risks in a given situation differ from person to person for exogenous
reasons and that personal characteristics (e.g., sense of balance) involve no externalities.
Also, in line with footnote 5,assumeequalizing difference functions for job risk W(p) and
personal characteristics are independent of each other in the relevant sense. Differences
in real risks can be handled in the example by specifying a distribution on kacross
workers. Then the arbitrage-everywhere argument breaks down because all workers can-
not be indifferent to all jobs. Even in the presence of perfect insurance, relative marginal
acceptance wages depend on kandare not equal for everyone. Obviously those indi-
viduals for whom kissmall apply for the riskier jobs.
. I.•.. • •
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twoare related by an identity: Compensationearnings + fringe
benefits. Fringe benefits were ignored above. Had they been included
(employers "pay" insurance premiums), no systematic relationship
between earnings and risk would have occurred. However, the rela-
tionship between compensation and risk would have been described
by (6). Insurance fringes act like a tax that is completely "backward
shifted" and nominal earnings fall by the amount of the benefit. Work-
ers always pay these costs, whether or not they nominally do so. There-
fore, since earnings before fringe benefits and insurance premiums
stand in a fixed relationship to each other (the insurance premium is
pkW), differences in compensation serve to equalize the market, not
differences in net earnings. For example, workmen's compensation
is a force making for uniformity in net wage rates across jobs with
alternative risks, so long as benefit schedules reflect true monetary
(and psychic) losses and the amount of insurance is no more than
workers would buy voluntarily. Henceforth the words wage and com-
pensation will be used interchangeably.
SUPPLY PRICE OF JOB RISK
Now the assumptions of perfect insurance and the absence of pain
and suffering are relaxed. Only two states of the world were dis-
tinguished in the example above, accident-no accident. Taking account
of alternative levels of injury severity requires introducing N pos-
sible states. For example, N might be 4, a value of 1 indexing no
accident, 2 indexing "minor" accidents, 3 "nonminor," nondeath
accidents, and 4 indexing death. Demarcation between states 2 and 3
or any other boundaries along the injury-severity continuum are
achieved through the use of dummy variable splits on an index such as
work days lost. For instance days lost greater than zero but less than
some number D1 correspond to state 2, days lost betweenand D2
correspond to state 3, and so forth. Finer distinctions (and more states)
can be made by combining work-days-lost severity indexes and the
physical nature of accidents, such as loss of limb, impairment of hear-
ing, and so on.
Conceptually, pain and suffering are represented by different-state
utility functions depending on the states themselves. For example,
suppose losses for states n through n + m can be converted into mone-
tary equivalents. Then the n through n + m state utility functions are
of the same functional form as utility associated with the no-accident
state. All other states have utility functions specific to themselves• :. • :
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measured in such a way as to be conformable with expected utility
axioms.7
In general, each possible job is described by an N —1component
vector of probabilities (P2, p3,... with pj indexing the proba-
bility of state i. [The no-accident probability is ignored because it can
be inferred from all the other probabilities: p1 =1
—pi, assuming
independence.] In other words, each job is perfectly described by a
bundle of different accident probabilities, with the package varying
from one job to another. Jobs are associated with a multivariate func-
tion, W(p2,..., giving the market wage for alternative bundles
of job risk. Workers maximize expected utility over all states subject
to the equalizing difference function W(p2, ...,Ps). Eachworker
chooses an optimal p-vector and applies for the job offering those prob-
abilities.
We shall not attempt to present a completely general treatment of the
problem. Discussion is specialized to two states for purposes of
illustration. State1represents no-accident; and state 2, accidents
resulting in death. Workers either survive their jobs or they don't,
certainly two mutually exclusive events! Each jobis associated with a
number p, now indexing the probability of death. The market reveals
an equalizing difference function W(p) giving compensation as a func-
tion of death risk. W'(p) is positive, and other restrictions will be put
on it later. Insurance is available at market price Xp/(l —p)per dol-
lar of coverage, with X1. The load factor is (X —1).
Assume a concave utility function U(Y) for the life state as before,
choosing the origin so that U(O) =0.The utility (bequest) function for
the death state is also concave with =0.For obvious rea-
sons, U and tfi are restricted to obey the inequality U(Y) > for
all common values of Y. The worker chooses p and I to maximize
E(1 —p)U[W(p)+y— I]+pfi(y + 1) (7)
where y is nonlabor income. W + y —[Xp/(l—p)]Iis income if the
worker lives and y + I is beneficiaries' income if he dies. Assuming E
is strictly concave in p and I, necessary and sufficient conditions for a
maximum are








The following properties of 0 can be derived from the implicit func-
tion theorem8 S
(i)
The marginal acceptance wage is positive and increasing in risk. 0,, is
the expected-utility compensated supply price to risky jobs and is
rising because of risk aversion, imperfect insurance, and pain and
suffering (U is not the same as vi).Property(i) is crucial to what fol-
lows.9
(ii)
The acceptance wage is increasing in expected utility and decreasing
in nonlabor income at any given risk. Moreover, an additional dollar
of nonlabor income lowers the acceptance wage (utility held constant)
by more than a dollar. The reason for the latter is that additional dol-
lars of nonlabor income increase utility in both states, thereby reducing
results can easily be checked by the reader. Take care always to treat 0 and I
as dependent variables and p, E, y, and A as independent variables in the differentiation.
It is conceivable that no insurance is purchased if strict concavity in (7) is not
assumed. Suppose marginal utility of bequests rapidly approach zero after some dollar
value. A husband might want to leave his wife with at least $100,000 if he dies, but
bequest dollars in excess of 100,000 do not yield mUch additional utility. It may be
rational for him not to purchase insurance if his nonlabor wealth is in the neighborhood of
$100,000. Even in such cases, the fundamental convexity property of indifference
curves in Figure 1 still applies.
The Value of Saving a Life 275
Equations (8) jointly determine optimal values of p and I. Notice that it
is no longer true that marginal utilities in both states are equal. Even if
they were (i.e., if X =1),equality would not imply equal incomes in
both states, because U' and q' are not identical functions. Hence the
arbitrage argument used in the example above no longer applies be-
cause people with alternative utility functions behave differently.
Conditions (8) are not very informative in and of themselves unless
functional forms are specified for U and 4,. In the absence of that, a
very general picture of equilibrium is obtained by going the route
described in the section above. Again define an acceptance wage 0 as
the amount of money the worker would willingly accept to work on
jobs of different risks at a constant utility index, conditioned on
optimal purchase of insurance. Then 0(p, E; y, X) is defined implicitly
by solving for 0 and I in terms of E, y and A from276 Marketand Nonmarket Aspects of Real Earnings
optimal amounts of insurance and payments of insurance premiums in
the life state.
OPE> 0 (iii)
The marginal acceptance wage increases at higher levels of welfare:
the better off a person is, the larger the monetary inducement neces-
sary to coax, him into a higher risk job. On the other hand, marginal
acceptance wages decrease as nonlabor income rises (utility "held
constant") for reasons stated under property (ii). Finally, increasing It
renders risk bearing more expensive and increases its reservation
price.
Risk/earnings indifference curves 0(p;E, y)for a worker with some
fixed amount of nonlabor income are shown in Figure 1. Labels E1,
E2,. ..,arein ascending order of expected utility, from property
(ii). Convexity follows from property (i). Notice that the slopes of the
indifference curves rise along a vertical line, a result of property
(iii).
The heavy line labeled W(p) represents risk/earnings opportunities
or the market equalizing-difference wage function.'° As usual, optimum
choice of p (represented byin the figure) occurs where the budget
line and an adjoining indifference curve have a common tangent.
Clearly, the curvature of 0(p) and W(p) must stand in a proper rela-
tionship to each other if the solution is to be unique and interior, as is
true in the assumption of strict concavity of (7).
Three empirically meaningful propositions emerge from properties
(i)—(iii) and the equilibrium condition in Figure 1.11
PropositionI: Job safety is a normal good.
This statement needs careful interpretation and qualification. Con-
sider the following parameterization of the budget: W(,p) =A+ BV(p),
where V(p) is an increasing function of p and A and B are parameters.
The statement holds true for changes in A. For example, let A in-
crease. The budget line rises parallel to its initial' position and ex-
pected utility also rises. But property (ilia) implies marginal accep-
tance wages rise too. Hence risk falls and the worker chooses a safer
job.'2 Changes in A are analogous to pure income effects in demand
'°Asshown by example in the preceding section, there is no reason for W(p) to be
linear in p. The budget constraint can be distinctly nonlinear.
"These statements are easy to prove analytically. Differentiate equations (8) and
exploit second-order conditions for a maximum, as usual.
12Somecasual evidence is relevant here. Secularly increasingjob safety in the U.S. has
been accompanied by a trend of rising real wages. No doubt improvements in safety




theory. The statement does not hold for changes in B. An increase in
B results in a negative income effect (on risk), but a positive substi-
tution effect (on risk) in that increasing marginal earnings on riskier
jobs makes risk bearing more attractive. The net outcome is unpre-
dictable without further specification.
Proposition II: Job safety is positively related to the price of in-
surance.
This is an immediate consequence of(iiic). Decreasing the insurance
load factor makes risk bearing cheaper, everywhere decreasing mar-
ginal rates of substitution between money and risk. More risk neces-
sarily is purchased.
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Proposition 1!!: Job safety is not necessarily normal with respect
to property income.
This nonintuitive result can be motivated in part as follows: Increas-
ing nonlabor income provides a kind of self-insurance against the
death state, since nonlabor income (willed to one's heirs) is not at
risk in the labor market. This reduces needs for market insurance and
makes risk bearing less expensive, a kind of substitution effect. How-
ever, increasing y also increases expected utility and has the effect of
increasing the marginal acceptance wage for any incremental risk, a
kind of income effect. The two effects work against each other. Me-
chanically, the result comes from properties (iib),(iiia) and (iiib).
An additional dollar of nonlabor income shifts the entire indifference
map downward by more than a dollar (jib) and also reduces marginal
rates of substitution for given expected utility measures (iiib). How-
ever, marginal valuation of riskis increasing in expected utility
(iiia) and marginal rates of substitution still increase along any vertical
line in Figure 1. The first effect is a force making for increased risk,
while the second works in the opposite direction. Curiously, it can be
shown analytically that risk is necessarily inferior in nonlabor income
when the insurance load is zero (i.e., X =1).Evidently, when the price
of insurance exceeds its actuarial value there is a possibility for the
kind of substitution effect described above to dominate the real income
effect, tantamount to a type of risk preference.
EQUALIZING DIFFERENCES AND SUPPLY PRICES
The discussion above shows that worker choice is characterized by
two equilibrium conditions: W(p) =0(p,E) and W'(p) =c3Ofap,two
equations in two unknowns, p and E. Workers differ in their attitudes
toward risk, bequest motives, and nonlabor income. Consequently
there is a distribution of acceptance wage functions in the market.
Those with less risk aversion have smaller marginal acceptance wages
(i.e., smaller values of äO/äp) and lower reservation prices to risky jobs.
The opposite might be true of people with many dependents or with
high degrees of risk aversion in the accident state. Whatever the source
of interpersonal differences, workers with lower marginal acceptance
wages work on riskier jobs.
A picture of market equilibrium on the supply side of the market is
shown in Figure 2. Ignore the curves labeledfor the moment. W(p)
is the equalizing difference function as in Figure 1. Two workers are
shown in Figure 2, one with acceptance wage 01andthe other with
02. >(302/ap) andworker 2 is employed on a riskier job, since
.. .. . . . .,.
. .







safety is not as valuable to him. The picture may be generalized. Add
more Workers and fill in all points on the W(p) line. It is apparent that
W(p) is the lower envelope of a family of acceptance wage functions
depending on the joint distribution of y, U andacross workers.
W(p) is observed, while the functionsare not. However, evaluate the
derivative of the equalizing wage difference function at some value of
p, say Then, from the equilibrium conditions, W'(p*) =aOi(p*,
E*)/8p for worlZers finding p's' optimal, and W'(p*) identifies the mar-
ginal acceptance wage for such workers. Therefore, W'(,p*) identifies
W'(p*) estimates how much money is necessary to induce a
person into accepting a small incremental risk. Alternatively, it esti-
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mates how much the person will pay to reduce risk by a small amount,
exactly the number we seek.
The empirical work reported below uses data from very risky jobs,
on the average perhaps as much as five times more risky than most
jobs in the U.S. economy. It must be true that individuals working on
such jobs have lower reservation supply prices and consequently
smaller demand prices for safety than the average worker. The point
is illustrated in Figure 2. Evaluating W' at p" provides the correct
estimate for person 2, but is an underestimate for person 1. The price
the latter is willing to pay for safety atis given by the slope of his
acceptance wage function evaluated atthe slope of 0' at the point
marked A in Figure 2. It follows from the fact that compensated supply
functions to risky jobs are rising (i.e., acceptance wage functions are
convex) that äOl(p*, E*)/,9p exceeds W'(p*). Most people in the labor
force do not work on risky jobs. Therefore, use of data on very risky
jobs understates average demand prices for safety at the observed risk
levels in our sample. This justifies our initial assertion that the esti-
mates below are conservative and probably biased downward when
extrapolated to the population as a whole.
DEMAND PRICE FOR JOB RISK
It was demonstrated above that W'(p) identifies supply price of risk
at the relevant margin. That conclusion was reached independently
of demand considerations. We now consider a very simple model of
demand prices and firm decisions in order to complete the model. It
will hardly be shocking to discover that W'(p) also identifies demand
price for risk at some margin.
Accidents are an unpleasant, though in part avoidable, by-product
of production. This fact of life (or of death!) can be represented
analytically by a joint production function F(x, p, L) =0for some
firm, where x is marketable output, p is the accident rate, and L is
labor input. Inputs other than labor are ignored. p can be a vector of
state accident probabilities as mentioned above. However, to simplify,
collapse it into a univariate index denoting the probability of death.
Invert F and assume the following properties for x =g(p,L):(i)
0 and < 0.Labor has positive and diminishing marginal
product. (ii)<0.Safety increases the marginal product of labor.
(iii) gp>0for 0p gp0for p whereis some "large,"
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gp arebest explained by noting that they imply that the transformation
locus between output (x) and safety (1 —p)is negatively inclined,
except possibly at very low levels of safety. Accidents are "produc-
tive," at least up to a certain point, and can be avoided only by chang-
ing the organization of production within the firm away from marketable
output and toward accident prevention. The assumption on gppmeans
the transformation function is concave.
The production function g(p, L) has been written so that safety is, in
effect, produced internally by the firm. Safety devices (such as guard
rails and hard hats) can also be purchased and installed externally.
Let G( 1 —p)represent the cost of externally provided safety (con-
verted to an annual flow), with G' and G"> 0. The latter means
installation activities are subject to increasing costs, though that is
not strictly necessary to what follows.
The firm maximizes profit H with respect to L and p
11= g(p, L) —W(p)L—G(1—p) (10)
where the price of x has been normalized at unity. Again W(p) repre-
sents the competitive wage that must be paid for alternative levels of
risk. Necessary conditions for a maximum are
gp+G' =W'(p)L
gL=W(p) (11)
Labor is hired up to the point where its wage and marginal product are
equal. Marginal costs of risk are the additional market wage payments
necessary to attract workers to riskier jobs. Marginal benefits come in
the form of additional market output and cost savings from installing
fewer safety devices. Second-order conditions require certain curva-
ture restrictions on W(p) as will be shown.
Symmetrically with the treatment above, define an offerfunction
4 as the amount the firm willingly pays the optimal number of workers
at alternative levels of risk and constant profit. With recourse to the




Clearly 34/3p is the compensated demand price for risk. Differentiat-
ing (12) [again, always treat 4 and L as dependent variables, and H




= — — — 0
The marginal demand price for risk is positive. However, even the
common assumption of concavity of the production function does not
guarantee that the compensated demand schedule is negatively in-
clined: 324)/3p2 can be positive.
The offer function 4)(p, H) defines a family of indifference curves in
money and risk, one member of which is shown in Figure 2. 4)' refers
to one firm and 4)2refersto another firm, possibly in a different in-
dustry and in any case, with a different technology than firm 1. The
diagram assumes 324)/3p2 < 0, which is not necessarily true. Equilib-
rium of each firm is characterized by tangency between the market
availabilities function W(p) and the lowest possible constant-profit
indifference curve (profit increases as 4) decreases at any level of risk,
since 34)/all < 0). W" must exceed 324)13p2 at the point of tangency for
an interior maximum.
Similarly to the case of worker choice, W'(p) =34)/äpat equilib-
rium, and W(p) represents an upper envelope of the distribution of
offer functions in the market. The family of offer functions depends on
the nature of production functions in various firms and industries and
on corresponding distributions of industrial safety technology. In
any event W'(p*) also identifies H*)/t3p,wherefirm i is one
that has chosenoptimally. Using the same logic as above, W'(p*)
overestimates the average supply price of safety (again, at p*) if p"
is a very risky job. This is easily seen in Figure 2, since the slope of
t94)'/3p at point B necessarily is smaller than the slope of 34)2/ap eval-
uated at the same level of job risk.13
MARKET EQUILIBRIUM: SUMMARY
It will be useful to summarize results of the model so far.
(a) The observable wage-risk relation represents a double envelope
'3Suppose L is exogenous. Then, the offer function is defined by the first equation in
(12), and it is easy to show that increased values of L reduce demand price for risk
(4PL< 0),providing incentives to offer safer jobs. Increasing incentives toward job
safety vary directly with establishment size because of larger cost savings from lower
wage rates. It is well known that accident rates decline with establishment size, at least
after some minimum size. Accident rates also tend to be low in very small establish-
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function: It is the lower boundary of a set of acceptance wage func-
tions and the upper boundary of a set of offer wage functions. Mar-
riages between jobs and applicants at each level of risk are represented
by common tangents of appropriate acceptance wage and offer wage
functions.
(b) The envelope property in (a) implies that the derivatives of ob-
served risk-wage differentials (evaluated at each level of risk) identify
marginal supply and demand prices of workers and firms choosing
those particular job risks.
(c) Supply price of risk (equivalently, demand price for safety)
identified in (b) from very risky jobs underestimates the average
supply price in the labor force for those risks, since people choosing
risky jobs have a comparative advantage at job risk bearing. Similarly,
demand price for risk (supply price of safety) identified from very risky
jobs overestimates the average demand price for most firms in the
economy, since firms offering risky jobs have a comparative disad-
vantage at producing safety.
(d) The numbers identified in (b) represent single points on com-
pensated supply and demand functions, not the functions themselves.
Use of such numbers for evaluation overestimates consumer surplus
of finite increases in safety because workers' compensated demand
schedules for safety are negatively inclined.
EQUILIBRIUM AND WORKER CHARACTERISTICS
A very simple demand model has been specified above, and it may
be too simple. Recall the production function has been written x
=g(p,L), where L is labor and p is risk. But what is labor?Our
data contain indicators of personal productivity such as education and
work experience. Suppose there are m such indicators, denoted by a
vector c =(c1,...,Cm). Ofcourse, sample wages vary with worker
characteristics as well as with job risk. Let W(p, c) represent the
market wage-risk—characteristics equalizing difference function. Writ-
ing the production function for a firm as we did implies that firms act
as if there exists a single index of labor input, L =flc1, ..., cm)
defined independently of job risk. If so, the production function must
be separable in c and p. This is also a sufficient condition for separa-
bility of W(p, c) as well. Suppose W(p, c) is additive inp and C:W(p,c)
=V(p)+ T(c). Hence, firms care only about total amounts of "skill"
they employ (i.e., L) independently of how skills come packaged in
14The reader may be thinking, "What is risk?" The two questions are very much re-
lated. See below.284 Marketand Nonmarket Aspects of Real Earnings
people and also independently of job risks to which their employees
are subjected. In effect, it means that packages of worker character-
istics can be untied. For example, firms might be indifferent between
a worker with 8 years of schooling and 10 years of experience and
another with 12 years of school and 3 years of experience, or be-
tween workers with other combinations of these characteristics.
The real issue under discussion here involves how many interac-
tions to allow in the risk and characteristics wage-explaining regres-
sion. At one extreme is the possibility for a universal implicit market
for risk, independent of worker personal productivities (no interac-
tions). At the other extreme are separate implicit markets for all possi-
ble combinations of personal characteristics (complete interactions).
The former case corresponds to the firm choice model sketched above.
Yet there is a distinct possibility that risk affects productivity in a
nonhomogeneous manner with respect to various productivity indi-
cators. Then some interactions are required. In general, the market
reveals implicit prices for both risk and worker characteristics. All
prices are determined simultaneously and cannot be separated,'5
and the firm choice model sketched above must refer to a single type
of worker (cheldconstant).
If there is no interaction in production between worker character-
istics and safety, only one risk premium for each value of risk appears
in the market. Furthermore, the risk-wage function is independent of
any further interaction between worker characteristics and attitudes
toward risk. Differences in worker characteristics (age, marital status,
and so on) that result in different acceptance wage functions simply
help identify which workers accept riskier jobs. On the other hand, if
there are interactions in production, differential risk premiums accord-
ing to personal characteristics generally appear, so long as the pre-
ferred characteristics are in sufficiently scarce supply. If these char-
acteristics are not in short supply, only those workers with preferred
attributes work on risky jobs and no differential risk premium need
arise in the market. Finally, if differential risk premiums exist, W(p) in
Figures 1 and 2 becomes a family of curves W(p, c),onefor each value
of c, as was noted above (see footnote 5).
Inpart, firm decisions can be handled formally as follows. The production function
is x =h(p, c1 c,,) = h(p, c). Profitis h(p, c)— W(p,c),maximizedover p and c.
Thefirm organizes production taking account of factor supplies (i.e., W(p, c)),designing
jobs and their risks and determining a set of worker-characteristics requirements.
Workers not meeting requirements are not hired by the firm. Now define a joint offer-
requirements function C(p, c,H),indicating offer prices for alternative risk-charac-
teristics requirements at constant profit, and compare the resulting indifference sur-












5.The Value of Saving a Life
The issue is rather thorny, but an example will clarify it. Consider
the regression model
W =+ a1p + a2(pz) + random error (13)
where W is observed wages, p is risk, z is worker age, and the a's are
regression coefficients. The pure effect of age, higher order terms in
p, and all other explanatory variables are impounded in the constant
term a0 for purposes of this discussion.
Age presumably affects worker's acceptance wages. Young workers
risk entire lifetimes of future consumption in taking high risk jobs and
have far more to lose than their older counterparts. Supply price to
risky jobs should fall with age on that account. Further, a typical in-
dividual may become more or less risk averse over his lifetime, in-
•ducing shifts in acceptance wage functions over the life cycle. Job
risk should be systematically related to age for both reasons. However,
variations of this variety are completely captured by movements along
the observed risk-wage function (taking account of possible effects
of age on a0) and there is no role here for extra marginal effects of age
on risk premiums per Se. Look at Figure 1. The changes under consider-
ation are represented by systematic variations in money-risk prefer-
ences, resulting in moving points of tangency between a life-cycle
shifting acceptance wage function and a fixed risk, market opportu-
nities function. Movements along W(p) should not be confused with
shifts in it, and all such changes are already counted in the pure risk
coefficient a1.
Age can affect market risk premiums only insofar as it reflects un-
measured characteristics whose productivities are affected by differ-
ential risk. Exposure to risky situations makes some people far less
effective agents of production than others. They not only accomplish
less work of their own, but also impose extra costs on others. Both
effects have to reduce wage rates of these persons if they are observed
working at risky jobs. Such wage differentials serve as compensation
for additional costs firms incur in employing them. For example,
"nerves of steel" is a scarce factor, but steely nerves capture rents
only in risky situations. Good balance is valuable to iron workers on
building sites but not to desk clerks, and so forth. In the present case,
young workers on the average have speedier reflexes than older ones
and have faster reactions to potential accidents. But older workers
have had more exposure and experience with job risk, and experience
and quick reflexes probably are substitutes. Hence the effect of age on





•..•.... . . —l
. ...•.•.
.•••I
• ••...•.286 Marketand Nonmarket Aspects of Real Earnings
pect the reflex effect to dominate, by and large, for workers past some
age that varies across occupations.
Whatever the interactions between risk differentials and personal
characteristics, the analysis underlying Figure1still applies. The
marginal effect of risk on wages evaluated at the person's exogenously
determined characteristics estimates supply price for risk or demand
price for safety. It also estimates firms' supply price of safety to
workers with those characteristics. It is certainly possible, however,
that observed risk differentials vary with worker attributes.
THE DATA
Empirical implementation of the model requires information on
earnings of individuals, job risks they face, and their personal and
job-related characteristics.It involves augmenting standard wage
equations with job-risk measures. Many cross-sectional sources of
earnings data are available and we have chosen one of them, the 1967
Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO). The SEO survey was de-
signed to heavily represent low-income populations and our sample is
restricted to an extract of the data, consisting of a random sample of
9,488 representative households in the U.S. population. Of these
observations, the sample was further reduced to adult male heads of
households. The SEO data provides information on personal and
industrial characteristics and labor force activities of individuals. It
also lists individuals' industry of employment a'id occupation.
The standard source of data on industrial hazards is published by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in conjunction with compliance
and experience surveys under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
These data give accidental death and injury rates for 4-digit SIC in-
dustry codes on an annual basis. Unfortunately, the BLS death and
injury data cannot be adequately matched to individuals and is un-
suitable for the purposes of this study. For example, it is possible
to assign the BLS average death and injury indexes (by industry) to
individuals in the SEQ tape because the individual's industrial attach-
ment is known. However, using the death and injury statistics in that
manner implies introducing a huge component of measurement error
for individuals, because job risks in each industry are not uniform
across occupations. Hence, any estimates of the risk premium obtained
in this way will probably be biased.
Luckily, another data source was discovered which does not suffer
from the aggregation problems inherent in published BLS sources.
The data used here come from the 1967 Occupation Study of the
. ..
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Societyof Actuaries. The purpose of the 1967 study was to measure
extrarisksassociated with some very hazardous occupations and the
study was based on a sample of insurance company records covering
3,252,262 policy years of workers' experience over the period 1955—
1964. The data were tabulated on a combined industry and occupa-
tional basis, and can be matched directly to individuals on the SEO
sample, using Census categories contained in the latter. The matching
procedure yielded 37 occupations on about 900 individuals. The oc-
cupations and their sample actuarial risks are listed in Table 1. Of
course, it would be quite rash to assert that the actuarial data over-
come all matching difficulties, because Table 1 shows that the ac-
tuarial classifications are rather broad. However, they are far more
narrowly defined than the BI.S data. We are extremely confident that
the degree of measurement error in attributing risks to SEO individuals
using the actuarial data is perhaps as much as an order of magnitude
smaller than would be true had we matched with BLS risk data—
especially for individuals working on very risky jobs, such as most of
those in Table 1. In other words, the actuarial study simply provides
the best data that are available for estimating risk premiums in the
labor market.16
The actuarial data have one other very good feature.. An expected
number of deaths was estimated in each occupation, based on the age
distribution of persons in the sample records and standard life tables.
Expected deaths were then subtracted from actual deaths and the resuli
normalized to yield an extradeathsper thousand policy years statistic
(those numbers are multiplied by 100 in Table 1). Hence the numbers
in Table 1 are net of normal age-specific death experience and measure
extra death risk associated with occupations. These statistics reflect
genuine occupational hazards that may cumulate with time spent in
the profession. To see how risky these jobs are, note that the mean
value in Table 1is approximately 100. In probability terms, this
amounts to an extra 1 in 1,000 probability of death. The probability
of death from the 1967 life table for white males 35 years of age was 2
in 1,000. Thus, though the probabilities are small in absolute terms,
they are very large relative to the risks most people incur in the ordi-
nary course of their lives.
'6After this study was completed, we discovered a paper by R. Smith (1973), who
used the BLS hazard data. At an earlier stage of our research, and before discovering
the Actuaries Study, we too experimented with BLS data. Our results were very similar
to Smith's. However, in view of the measurement error, we believe that Smith's very
strong conclusions about the workings of the labor market are totally unwarranted and
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TABLE I
Sample Occupations and Risks
Occupation Risk a Occupation Risk a
Fishermen 19 Truck drivers 98
Foresters 22 Bartenders 176
Teamsters 114 Cooks 132
Lumbermen 256 Firemen 44
Mine operatives 176 Guards, watchmen, and
Metal filers, grinders 'and doorkeepers 267
polishers 41 Marshals, constables,
Boilermakers 230 sheriffs and bailiffs 181
Cranemen and derrickmen 147 Police and detectives 78
Factory painters 81 Longshoremen and steve-
Other painters 46 dores 101
Electricians 93 Actors 73
Railroad brakemen 88 Railroad conductors 203
Structural iron workers 204 Ships' officers 156
Locomotive firemen 186 Hucksters and peddlers 76
Power plant operatives 6 Linemen and servicemen 2
Sailors and deckhands 163 Road machine operators 103
Sawyers 133 Elevator operators 188
Switchmen 152 Laundry operatives 126
Taxicab drivers 182 Waiters. 134
SOURCE: Society of Actuaries.
°Unitsof measure are extra deaths per 100,000 policy years. To convert to the prob-
ability of an extra death per year on each job multiply by 0.0000 1.
A less attractive feature of the actuarial risk data is that they only
include death rates. Separate indexes for death and nondeath acci-
dents would be preferable, but nondeath accident statistics comparable
to those in Table 1 are not available. We must rest content with the
knowledge that death rates and injury rates in the BLS industry data
are highly correlated, and there is no reason for that not to be true in
our data as well.
Several earnings measures are available from SEO data. We have
experimented with all of them and settled on the weekly wage, because
it probably is measured most accurately. We would prefer to use a
measure of total compensation, but the value of fringe benefits are not
available on the SEO tape or any other data set on individuals known
to us. This omission must reduce the observed risk differential, againThe Value of Saving a Life 289
pointingtoward conservative estimates. The extent of bias depends on
the size of the load factor and the importance of pain and suffering,
as well as on the precise differences between life (U) and bequest (i/i)
utilityfunctions. In any event, the average amount of life insurance
provided in fringe benefits is not very large, and this source of bias
must be rather small.
ESTIMATION
Our goal is to estimate the equalizing difference function W(p, c).
Fourtypes of independent variables are used to control for factors
determining wage rates other than job risk. These are the content of
the c variables. The first set controls for regional and urban-nonurban
wage differentials. The second set measures individuals' personal
characteristics, including age, education, family size(or marital
status), and race. The square of age and education can be included to
allow for nonlinearities. The third set controls for other characteristics
of the job, including unionization, dummy variables for manufacturing
and service industries, and three major occupational dummy variables,
one for operatives (OC1), another for service workers (0C2), and a
third for laborers (0C3). Socioeconomic status (SES) was used at one
stage instead of the occupational dummies as a crude measure of other
nonpecuniary aspects of work. SF5 is an index number based on occu-
pation, education, and income, and it might capture some other types
of equalizing differences, though it was not constructed for that
purpose.
Means and standard deviations of all variables are shown in Table 2.
Note that the sample includes a much higher proportion of union mem-
bers than obtains in the labor force generally. Sample mean earnings
on an annual basis is about $6,600 (=132X 50), which is a bit less than
average earnings among male manufacturing workers during this
period.
Regression planes have been fitted by least squares, using arithmetic
values of earnings as the dependent variable; and alternatively, using
the log of earnings as the dependent variable. The arithmetic results are
•shown in Table 3. Results using the log of earnings are reported in
Table 4 and are very similar to the arithmetic results when evaluated
at sample means.
The first two columns in Table 3 give alternative estimates of
W(p, c)onthe strong assumption of no interactions. All the nonrisk
variables are assumed to simply shift the wage-risk relationship, leav-
ing its slope intact. Regression coefficients of almost all characteristics
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West . .17 .38
Family size exceeds 2 .76 .42
Manufacturing industry .24 .42
Service industry .58 .49
Worker is white .90 .30
Worker is employed full time • .98 .10
Worker belongs to union .45 .49
Worker is married .92 .26
Occupation is operative .27 .44
Occupation is service .45 .49
Occupation is laborer .22 .42
Continuous variables
Age (years) 41.8 .11.3
Education (years) 10.11 2.73
Weeks worked in 1966 49.4 5.4
Hours worked last week 44.9 11.6
Risk (probability x





a Meanis proportion in sample with designated characteristic. The number of observa-
tions is 907.
variables have the expected signs found in most other studies, and most
are statistically significant. Further discussion is unwarranted here.
The theory requires the wage-risk function to be positively inclined,
and that is certainly the case on the appropriate one-tailed test of
significance (see equations 1 and 2 in Table 3). [It is interesting to note
that the simple correlation between risk and wage (not shown) is
negative in these data.] (Risk) 2 was also entered in the regression but
was not significant. We are not trying to argue here that W(p, c)is
linear in p, since most of the results using log W as dependent variable
in Table 4 are at least as good as those in Table 3. The data simply doThe Value of Saving a Life 291




Estimates of W(p, c)— LinearForm
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TABLE 3 (concluded)
Independent Variable Equation I Equation 2 Equation 3Equation 4
Occupation 2: service —24.6 — —18.1 —19.9
worker (9.5) . (4.66) (5.05)














R2 .41 .42 .39
Number of observations 907 907 907 813
Sample All All All White only
NOTE: The dependent variable is the weekly wage rate. The SES index has been con-
verted to dummy variables. Standard errors are in .parentheses.
not provide enough resolution on functional form to make a choice.
The implied t statistic on risk is larger when SES is used in place of
occupation (equation 2, Table 3), though the point estimates are not
very different. First, consider the point estimate 0.03 52 obtained from
equation 1 of Table 3. The risk variable has been scaled by for
computational purposes and the estimate 0.0352 implies that jobs with
extra risks of 0.001 (a value near the sample mean) pay $3.52 per
week more than jobs with no risk. This amounts to about $176 per
year, and the slope of the regression on a yearly basis is $176,000
(=.0352X 50 X Recall that the slope of the wage-risk relation
W'(p) estimates the implicit supply and demand price to risky jobs.
To interpret the result, think in terms of the following conceptual ex-
periment. Suppose 1,000 men are employed on ajob entailing an extra
death risk of .001 per year. Then, on average, one man out of the 1,000
will die during the year. The regression indicates that each man would
be willing to work for $176 per year less if the extra death probability
were reduced from .001to .0. Hence, they would together
$176,000 to eliminate that death: the value of the life saved must be
$176,000. Furthermore, it must also be true that those firms actually
offering jobs involving .001 extra death probabilities must have to
spend more than $176,000 to reduce the death probability to zero, be-
I...The Value of Saving a Life
TABLE 4
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TABLE 4 (concluded)
Indeoendent Variable Equation IEquation 2Equation 3Equation 4
Occupation 2: service —.126 — —.110 —124
worker (.075) (.037) (.039)










R' .47 .46 .48 .43
Number of observations 907 907 907 813
NOTE: The dependent variable is the log of the weekly wage rate. The SES index has
been converted to dummy variables. Standard errors are in parentheses.
cause there is a clear-cut gain from risk reduction if costs were less
than that amount.
Use of SES dummies Instead of occupational dummies increases
the point estimate of the risk variable to .0520, with virtually no
change in its standard error. Going through the same argument as
above implies a value of life of $260,000; Though the t statistic is
larger in equation 2 than in equation 1 of Table 3, we are not pre-
pared to accept equation 2 as a necessarily better specification because
of some reservations on the meaning of the SES variable. Correspond-
ing estimates in Table 4 evaluated at the sample mean wage range
somewhat smaller than those in Table 3. Equation 1 of Table 4 implies
a point estimate of $136,000 (=.000206x 132 X 50 X while
equation 2 implies an estimate of $189,000 (=.000286x 50 x 132 X
Further, standard errors of risk coefficients are slightly larger in
Table 4. Nevertheless, the estimates lie in a reasonably narrow range
of about $200,000 '±$60,000.
Equation 3 in Tables 3 and 4 shows the results of limited interactions
between risk and some of the other characteristics. Limitations on
sample size forced a simple cross-product specification, rather than
separate regressions on corresponding data cells. Risk is crossed with
age, union membership, marital status and race in equation 3. As ex-
plained earlier, cross-product terms do not reflect differences in inch-•'..:
— —.
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vidual's utility functions. Instead, they represent differences in the
locus of opportunities available to them, due to differential ability to
work in risky situations.
A. Age
To reiterate our example above, age is likely, to cut two ways on
risky jobs. Young workers lack caution and experience, but have
superior reflexes and recuperative ability. Our hypothesis was that
physical deterioration of skills would eventually dominate and the
results seem to be consistent with it. The age-risk cross-product term
is negative though not significant, and firms offer older workers smaller
risk premiums than younger workers. Evidently younger workers are
more productive in risky situations. However, the estimate may also
reflect measurement error.'7
B. Marital Status
There is also some evidence that marital status affects risk pre-
miums. Of course, we expect married workers to have a higher supply
price to risky jobs than nonmarried workers, because they have more
dependents. Again, this should induce married workers to apply for
less risky jobs, other things being equal, and not change the observed
risk premium. The fact that marital status increases the risk premium
must mean that when married workers do in fact take risky jobs they
are more productive at working on them. Exactly how such differential
productivity arises is difficult to say, though we conjecture that mar-
ried workers might on the average be more careful and cautious than
the nonmarried.
C. Unionism
Unionism also increases the risk premium. Here the market is
restricted, and unions might collect their rents through higher risk
premiums rather than by other means. It is possible that lack of free
entry into these markets renders the typical union member more risk
averse than would be true in free markets, forcing firms to pay higher
risk premiums in order to entice unwilling union members to work on
is a possibility that the negative regression coefficient reflects measurement
error. Older workers may be heavily weighted in the low risk end of each occupation
and our risk measures may overstate the real risks they face. If W(p) is truly increasing,
earnings are lower for older workers appearing to work on riskier jobs in our data than
they really do. We know age-specific extra-risk data must be available on the work
sheets of the actuarial study because the published statistics have been age adjusted in
the manner described above. Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain the raw data.296 Marketand Noninarket Aspects of Real Earnings
the riskier jobs. Again, we cannot rule out the hypothesis that unionism
and its resulting "industrial discipline" make workers more productive
on risky jobs.
D. Race
The relationship between race and risk premiums is very complex.
The white-risk cross-product term is negative (and not significant at
conventional levels), but the results are not easy to interpret. For one
thing, we know from other studies that nonwhites tend to be loaded in
the low wage end of occupational job classifications. Notice again that
the occupations in Table 1 may be too broadly defined for detecting
racial differences, if nonwhites tend to be highly represented in the
riskier subcategories of each classification, our risk index is measured
erroneously for them. This in itself would tend to produce the result
found in Tables 3 and 4 and cross-terms would reflect measurement
error in the data. The coefficient suggests that nonwhites receive higher
risk premiums than whites, but it may simply be the case that they work
at even more risky jobs than our data say they do (again, assuming
W'(p) > 0). Alternative hypotheses are also available. (1) Nonwhites
may be better workers in risky situations than whites. For example,
we know that a large fraction of structural iron workers are nonwhite,
and it is said that these individuals have an unusual sense of balance
compared to most people in the population. (2) There may be less dis-
crimination against nonwhites in risky jobs than in less risky ones.
To get around possible measurement errors, we reran the regression
excluding nonwhites from the sample. The result is shown by equation
4 in Table 3, and previous conclusions regarding other variables are
hardly affected.'8
CONCLUSION
We have estimated marginal valuations of safety for a select group of
individuals in 1967. All qualifications surrounding our estimates have
Computationof the marginal risk premium under the cross-product specification
must be made at specific values of the interactive variables (age, race, and so on) be-
cause W'(p) is then a function of those variables. A little experimentation with equa-
tiOns (3) and 4 shows that the imputations vary a great deal, depend-
ing on the point in the sample at which they are made. Indeed, some of these imputations
are actually negative (e.g., older white nonunion, nonmarried individuals), which may
indicate an undesirable restriction of the functional form or measurement error and not
necessarily a model defect. We have not imposed any nonnegative restrictions on the
estimates. Further, the possibilities of measurement error extensively pointed out at
several points in the text preclude too much massaging of the data. Hence, we regard
the cross-product results as suggestive only.
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been given in the text and there is no need to repeat them here.19 Cer-
tainly this study indicates feasibility of the method, the usual caveats
about data quality notwithstanding. Are the estimates reasonable? We
are unaware of similar studies with which to compare our results. How-
ever an example suggested by Bailey (1968) may be informative in this
regard, and also illustrates how the estimates can be used.
The National Safety Council estimates that highway deaths would be
reduced by about 10,000 per year if all automobile users wore lap
safety belts. Assuming that the estimate is correct, seat belts reduce
the probability of dying in an automobile accident from about 25 per
hundred thousand (25 X per year to about 20 per hundred thou-
sand per year (20 X 10 Usingthe risk coefficient in equation 1 of
Table 3 we estimate thatthe average person in our sample would be
willing to pay at least $8.80 per year (in 1967 dollars) for a seat belt for
himself. The cost of seat belts includes not only the purchase price
and installation costs, but also costs associated with use, including
bother and time spent buckling and unbuckling, so that it is easily
within the realm of possibility that decisions not to purchase seat
belts prior to the law were rational. We can make some more back-of-
the-envelope calculations. How much would the time and bother costs
(of individuals in our sample) have to be to justify not using seat
belts even after they are mandatory? The sample mean hourly wage
was about $3.50.Usingthat as an estimate of the value of time, time
spent buckling and unbuckling would have to be about 2.5hoursper
year to cost as much as $8.80. Assuming 500 trips per year, this
amounts to about 18 seconds per trip in time-equivalent costs of using
seat belts, a much smaller number than Bailey assumed. We leave it to
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Comments on "The Value of Saving a Life:
Evidence from the Labor Market"
MARVIN KOSTERS
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
IN their everyday conversations and discussions, people are often
reluctant to espouse the view that a monetary value can or should be
placed on life. Yet, as Thaler and Rosen point out, in the normal course
of their working and leisure activities, people are constantly making
choices involving risks and rewards. Through these choices, they are
implicitly placing some valuation on life or on the risk of death. In
addition, public policy decisions very often involve choices concerning
public expenditure of funds or the cost of applying regulations com-
pared to their impact on the risk of accident, injury, or death.
In making public policy choices, it would be extremely useful to
have information on the value society places on risk reduction in terms
of the choices of its members, even though determining how much
ought to be spent may remain elusive. The conceptual framework de-
veloped by Thaler and Rosen in this paper is extremely valuable in
gaining insight into what might be meant by questions like: How much
are people willing to pay (or forgo) to reduce the risk of serious injury
or death? How does what they are willing to pay relate to the resource
Rosen, S. "Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure
Competition." Journalof Political Economy 82(January/February 1974): 34—55.
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costs of restructuring jobs or altering equipment to reduce these risks?
What interpretation can be placed on data and analyses dealing with
alternative risk/reward situations? In addition, the propositions that
emerge from the analysis are of considerable interest on their own
right, since they are not all easily derived through intuition.
The empirical section presents estimates of the implicit price that
is paid through wage differentials in the job market for variation in
exposure to risk of death. The results are of particular interest be-
cause they were generated by using a set of data providing risk meas-
ures for quite detailed occupational categories, and the data provide
relatively clean measures of net risk. The conceptual framework
developed in the paper enables the authors to make careful distinc-
tions between the price concept for which they were able to obtain
estimates and concepts involving demand curves for safety or cost
curves for risk reduction.
The price estimates obtained, while difficult to judge in terms of
plausibility, are not so high or so low that they can be easily dismissed
as irrelevant for application in a real-world policy-problem situation.
The experiments with interaction terms are also extremely. interesting,
but unfortunately the data cannot provide sufficient resolution to
explore them in any great detail. These relations are also likely to be
extraordinarily complex because it is easily conceivable that there are
differences in the direction of the effects between occupations. For
example, age may reduce the price of risk bearing in some instances,
while in other instances, increased age may be more than compensated
for by work experience. The interpretation of these interaction effects
is quite subtle, and the conceptual framework developed in the paper
is valuable for distinguishing between movements along the
risk function and differences in its slope represented by these inter-
action effects. As indicated in the paper, these interactions must
reflect differences in productivity, market power, discrimination, and
the like.
The higher risk premium estimated for unionism, however, suggests
the possibility that better occupational risk information could play a
role. It seems likely that unions are better equipped to assemble good
information on risk and utilize it more effectively in bargaining than
might be the case for nonunion workers. If poor information on dif-
ferences in risk between occupations leads to a relatively greater em-
phasis placed by workers on wage premiums when they make their
wage/risk choices, differences in the quality of risk information could
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wage risk decisions as if they were applying a Bayesian decision frame-
work, with more emphasis placed on the risk side of the bargain as the
quality of information on- real risk improves, a bias would be intro-
duced into the estimated price of risk that operates in the opposite
direction of the bias from analyzing occupations at the riskier end of
the occupational spectrum. The role of information is not addressed
in the paper, but a glance at the occupational risk data makes it hard to
avoid the feeling that information quality may be important. For ex-
ample, I would not have thought that it is more risky to be an eleva-
tor operator than a marshal, constable, sheriff, or bailiff, or that risk
of death is nearly twice as high for waiters as it is for police and detec-
tives! It is worth noting, however, that although it would be plausible
to assume that nonwhites might have poorer information on risk than
whites, the evidence suggests that nonwhites obtain higher risk pre-
miums than whites.
The estimates developed in the paper are based on data drawn from
the "demand for safety" side of the conceptual framework. It would
be interesting to know how private firms treat the analysis of the supply
side in making decisions on altering job content, working conditions,
or equipment in order to devote optimal resources to provision of
safety. If engineering studies of such alternatives were available, they
could provide information from an independent source on the implicit
price attributed by firms to variations in risks. It would also be inter-
esting to explore decisions by the military concerning death risks to
see if the implicit price of risk is significantly higher in what must be
an occupation with significantly higher risk than those considered in
this paper.
The qualifications on the meaning and interpretation of the esti-
mate of the increase in wage premiums accompanying higher risk
are so carefully spelled out in the paper that cautious analysts might be
reluctant to place much reliance on the estimate for policy purposes.
For small policy changes, however, the conceptual basis of the esti-
mate is probably adequate for policy purposes. Most policy changes
that might be analyzed using estimates of this sort in an effort to quan-
tify their impact and desirability are likely to be small compared to the
entire package of risk-reward choices that confronts the average per-
son. Of course, policies that influence risk in a person's working en-
vironment may have the largest single impact on the typical person's
overall risk portfolio, since such a large fraction of most peoples'
lives is spent at work. The significance of work in the typical person's
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are willing to pay for reduction in risk through analysis of wage-risk
relations in the marketplace very persuasive.
Comments on "The Value of Saving a Life:
Evidence from the Labor Market"
ROBERT E. LIPSEY
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
AND QUEENS COLLEGE
THALER and Rosen wish to find a measure of the risk an individual
incurs by working in a given hazardous occupation rather than in the
average occupation. They wish to associate this risk with the additional
wage that is required to induce an individual to accept the hazardous
occupation, in order to calculate individuals' valuations of safety.
However, as we might infer from some of the surprises in their list
of hazardous occupations, the data on risk that they use measure some-
thing else: the extra risk to an insurance company of insuring those
who are in a particular occupation. That insurance company risk in-
cludes both the true occupational risk and something we might call
personal-characteristics risk—the risk that arises from the fact that
people who go into bartending, for example, may have habits or char-
acteristics aside from a lesser aversion for risk, which Thaler and
Rosen mention, that would produce high mortality rates no matter
what occupation they entered. Since these personal characteristics
are attached to the individuals, rather than to the occupations they
enter, the associated mortality risks will not be compensated for by
higher wages. The only case in which the personal-characteristics
risk might enter the wage rate for an occupation is that of interaction
between the effects of the two types of risks (a person who leans to-
ward heavy drinking may lean further in that direction if he becomes
a bartender). Thus, the independent variable for risk in the Thaler-
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not clear whether the irrelevant personal-characteristics part of the
insurance risk is systematically related to the relevant part. One might
guess that the presence of this personal-characteristics element in the
risk measure produces a downward bias in the estimate of the price of
occupational risk, additional to the bias from self-selection of less
risk-averse workers.